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their pages. Yet the books are skillful and sprightly. The photo-
graphs and illustrations have the ingratiating effect of making the 
document and the institution that has interpreted it seem at once 
majestic and ordinary. John Marshall, Dred Scott, and William 
and Lillian Gobitis, in their own ways and in their own times, af-
firmed the rich brew of ideals and ambitions that form the essence 
of American constitutionalism. To that extent, both books prove 
the old saw that a picture is worth a thousand words. 
SAVING THE REVOLUTION: THE FEDERALIST PA-
PERS AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING. Edited by 
Charles R. Kesler.' New York, N.Y.: The Free Press. 1987. 
Pp. ix, 334. $29.95. 
Harvey Flaumenhaft 2 
We should make an effort to inquire into the principles of the 
American political tradition before we abandon it as inarticulate or 
indefensible-that is the message of this collection of essays, origi-
nally presented at a conference on The Federalist at the Henry Sal-
vatori Center at Claremont McKenna College in 1985. The editor, 
Professor Charles Kesler, believes that The Federalist was a great 
achievement in political science, and that Publius remains the edu-
cator of a free people and the shaper of their future statesmen. 
Professor Kesler claims that while The Federalist is more 
widely read and perhaps more effusively praised than ever before, it 
is nonetheless much misunderstood. The book which Kesler has 
produced is a polemic, as was the book which it is meant to eluci-
date. It is, however, a polemic of a special kind. It praises The 
Federalist for teaching by example a lesson in civility, and what it 
praises, it practices. It is a very civil polemic, very helpful for 
thinking about the informing spirit of the American republic. 
In our day, says Kesler, the founders' defense of their work is 
itself in need of defense against two sorts of critiques. On the one 
hand, some prominent conservatives, who believe that there has 
been a deterioration in the American citizenry and in its govern-
ment, find a cause of that decline in the deliberate failure of the 
I. Assistant Professor of Government, Claremont McKenna College. 
2. Tutor, St. John's College in Annapolis. 
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founders to provide for education in the principles and habits upon 
which republican government depends. In this view, the founders, 
unlike their ancient counterparts, chose to rely upon the self-inter-
est of the citizens and the ambition of national office holders. Con-
servatives who hold this opinion of the founding tum to the 
principles of less democratic ages, and of men whom they believe to 
be wiser, for the inspiration and instruction that they do not find in 
the political thought of the American founders. 
Some influential liberals, on the other hand, who share with 
these conservatives the view that the American founding does not 
encourage healthy republican politics, draw the opposite conclu-
sion. They believe that what the people need is not some imported 
moral instruction, but rather an awakening to the progressive pos-
sibilities of direct or radical democracy, so that measures can be 
taken to harmonize the Constitution with the spirit of our age. 
Such liberals seek to liberate the people from governmental dead-
lock, the result of antidemocratic eighteenth-century mechanisms 
which frustrate the evolving desires of the people for solutions to 
our ever-multiplying social and economic problems. 
Saving the Rerolution offers a more favorable view of the 
founding. The Federalist is presented as teaching a two-fold lesson 
in constitutionalism: first, the need for a permanent form of govern-
ment anchored in a written constitution to protect the unalienable 
rights of man and to serve the public good; and second, the inculca-
tion of man's duties not only under the Constitution but also to it. 
The Federalist is also presented as teaching a lesson in civility, pro-
viding an example of the sober, candid, public-spirited reflection re-
quired for a deliberation in which a people really chooses its 
government. Sa.,ing the Re-.olution thus is meant to show how con-
stitutionalism is taught. The Preface ends with these words by the 
editor: 
Claremont was the natural place to bold the conference that began this book, since 
it was home for many years to the country's foremost scholars of The Federalist, 
Douglass Adair and Martin Diamond, both now deceased. All of the contributions 
to this book are indebted, in one way or another, to these men. Even those of us 
who disagree more than we agree with them gladly acknowledge their writings as a 
stimulus to our own thinking about The Federalist, and hence about America. 
About this book it might be similarly said that those who think 
seriously about America, and hence about The Federalist, even 
those who disagree rather more than they agree with the contribu-
tions to the book, are likely to find in many of them an excellent 
stimulus to thought. 
The editor's Introduction presents the point of view that unifies 
the book, together with an overview of its various chapters. The 
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founders, says Kesler, sought to save the Revolution by constitu-
tionalizing it. This meant providing the national government with 
authority sufficient to meet the exigencies of union, securing a sepa-
ration of powers that would protect the true principles of republican 
government against both the ambition of the few and the folly of the 
many, and confirming the equality of man in the rule of law. The 
object of The Federalist was to contribute to education in self-gov-
ernment by teaching the necessity of that constitutionalization. 
This teaching showed the importance of a national opinion that 
would be enlightened, moderate, and just-as well as courageously 
loyal to the preservation and good name of the republic. "Publius" 
sought to persuade the opponents of the Constitution that the Con-
stitution was the means to save the Revolution as well as republi-
canism itself; if our republic is to endure, then subsequent 
generations also need to be shown the goodness of the principles of 
the American republic. 
The study of The Federalist in our own time, by making ex-
plicit what the Constitution means but does not say in so many 
words, can help to correct the partial views of American conserva-
tives who revere the Constitution but deprecate the Declaration of 
Independence, as well as of American liberals who celebrate the 
Declaration but are impatient with the Constitution (except for the 
Bill of Rights appended to it). A comprehensive view, a view both 
revolutionary and conservative, would bring together the doctrine 
of the equality of human beings in their natural rights, and the doc-
trine of the organization of constitutional powers in the American 
republic. This book is meant to help to form that comprehensive 
view. 
The chapters follow roughly the order of the topics addressed 
by Publius, moving from papers on the Union to papers on the parts 
of the government of the Union. Then, having treated the teachings 
of The Federalist itself, the chapters go on to discuss other treat-
ments of The Federalist, as well as to consider its effectiveness. 
I 
The first chapter is by Professor Kesler himself. His point of 
departure is the prevailing interpretation of The Federalist's polit-
ical science. According to this interpretation, says Kesler, The Fed-
eralist's political science has its source in modem political 
philosophy-the writings of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Mon-
tesquieu-and it has its core in Federalist No. lO's argument for an 
extensive republic: by multiplying interests, the extensive republic 
makes majority tyranny unlikely, though in doing so it also dilutes 
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patriotism and gives society a predominant tone of self-interested-
ness. Kesler, by contrast, argues that in the teaching of The Feder-
alist the role of No. 10 is not central but preparatory. According to 
Kesler, the prevailing interpretation reads No. 10 as an epitome of 
the whole Federalist, and questions the moral seriousness of republi-
can citizenship in America, while he himself reads No. 10 as part of 
a developing presentation, in which a teaching about the opinions 
and habits required for republican citizenship is essential. 
Since this controversy is in some ways a continuation of the 
original debate over the ratification of the Constitution, Kesler's 
chapter is followed by two chapters on the controversy between The 
Federalist and the Anti-Federalists. 
Murray Dry briefly presents The Federalist's direct response to 
specific Anti-Federalist criticisms, after which he turns to the argu-
ments of some influential Anti-Federalist critics. He shows first 
how each side viewed the issue before the country and how it 
viewed the other side, as well as how each side viewed the founding 
in general and the compromises of the Convention in particular. 
Then, before considering the debate about what chiefly concerned 
the Anti-Federalists-federalism and the threat of a consolidation 
of all power in the national government-he examines the two dif-
ferent views of republican government that lay behind that debate. 
The subsequent examination of federalism itself involves two related 
topics: the definition {and redefinition) of federalism, and the extent 
of the legislative powers given to the Union (particularly the powers 
to tax and to raise armies). 
Dry's chapter is an excellent brief account of important aspects 
of the founding controversy, and it is a very useful aid to reading 
The Federalist. Although it does speak of the Anti-Federalist fear 
of the aristocratic few, as well as of the Anti-Federalist emphasis on 
mild government and citizen participation, this essay by Dry serves 
the particular purposes of this volume mostly as a contrast to the 
chapter by Broyles. 
Broyles attacks the arguments as well as the motives of the 
Anti-Federalists, and presents Publius as an advocate of high-toned 
government which would elevate the nation morally. According to 
Broyles, although the national government was meant to have only 
a few specified powers, these were to go much beyond merely secur-
ing self-preservation; they were to enable the national government 
to supervise the states' use of their many unrestricted powers. 
While the various state governments might foster a variety of com-
mon opinions and actions, the national government was to foster 
republican virtue properly understood as the vigilant and manly 
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spirit in which those various opinions and actions were to be 
judged. The national government was to engage in the spirited pur-
suit of grand objectives involving national character and dignity. 
On the foundation of such national policy, public morals could 
soar, especially when responding less to legislative attitudes and 
more to the leadership coming from Publius's new invention, the 
popular presidency. 
Broyles writes to defend what he calls the founders' defense of 
the Constitution's true federalism. He says that it needs defense 
against contemporary Anti-Federalism. This, he says, was given 
classic expression in Martin Diamond's sympathetic restatement of 
what Diamond called the "small republic" argument, which went 
so far as to imply the moral superiority of the Anti-Federalist posi-
tion. Today, says Broyles, liberal and conservative academic par-
tisans are battling over the spoils of a national government reduced 
to the status of a mere facilitator. They do not notice, he says, the 
position taken by the founders when they debated the Anti-
Federalists. 
If that is so, however, this chapter by Broyles will not help as 
much as it might have, had its argument been better articulated. As 
an example of the sort of thing that does not do Broyles's case much 
good, let the following suffice. Quoting the assertion, in Federalist 
No. 35, that extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the 
principles of political economy are necessary if taxes are not to be 
oppressive or maldistributed, Broyles says: "This passage almost 
goes to the extent of saying that a proper national tax policy will be 
of itself sufficient to prevent oppression of the human spirit." But 
the passage does not come anywhere near to saying what Broyles 
sweepingly asserts that it does. This is not the only place where 
evidence is poorly marshalled for an argument that is not tightly 
put together. 
After a pair of chapters on the constitutional significance of a 
Union composed of many states, comes Patrick J. Garrity's essay 
on The Federalist's treatment of foreign policy, the aspect of ana-
tion's affairs where its unity or lack thereof is hardest to ignore. 
The editor sums up the contribution of this chapter by saying 
that-unlike those of our contemporaries who separate idealism 
and realism in debating foreign policy-Publius prudently unites 
morality and utility; unlike those who unrefiectively call for biparti-
sanship, the authors of The Federalist realize that farseeing parti-
sanship is required to bring into being a stable and respectably 
bipartisan unity of morality and utility. 
This chapter adds little to the treatment of the theme of the 
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book, though it does speak truth about matters of importance. I 
shall therefore not say more about it, but instead pass on to a closer 
examination of the most important essay in this first part of the 
book-the opening chapter on Federalist No. 10 and American re-
publicanism, by Professor Kesler. 
II 
Kesler begins by discussing how The Federalist has been inter-
preted. He attributes to Martin Diamond (and, to a lesser extent, 
Douglass Adair) the thesis that The Federalist is thoroughly mod-
em and that the extended sphere is of central importance in its new 
republicanism. Not only did Diamond insist that the Constitution 
succeeded as a remedy for the ills of republican government because 
of the extended sphere; he also considered this to be the most novel 
and important theoretical ingredient in The Federalist. Publius, in 
Diamond's view, broke with classical theory and practice, and ac-
cepted the Hobbesian statement of the political problem even 
though he rejected the Hobbesian solution. In this novel solution to 
the Hobbesian problem, liberalism and republicanism become, not 
means for ascending to a nobler life, but means for solving Hobbes-
ian problems more moderately. Thus interpreted, says Kesler, the 
republicanism of Publius becomes merely a means to his liberalism, 
to doctrines of individual rights and liberty bounded only by the 
dictates of comfortable self-preservation. A republic, if extensive, 
will take in a multiplicity of interests, so that a majority bent upon 
injustice will have great difficulty in getting together and staying 
together; thus the danger from majority faction will be much dimin-
ished-but the price, according to Diamond, is that the country 
becomes crassly commercial. Politics becomes solid but low-ac-
quisitive, selfish, narrow, and vulgar. Diamond's Publius deliber-
ately promotes a politics that shuns the traditional goal of character 
formation, and abandons the traditional emphasis on the teaching 
of political opinions to the citizens as part of the shaping of their 
character. Habits and opinions are left for cultivation to society, 
which, though it be a realm of bourgeois virtue and even of republi-
can virtue of a kind, will never rise high above self-interest, albeit 
self-interest rightly understood. The founders, in this account, take 
the lead in arranging to supply the defect of better motives by ar-
ranging for an opposition and rivalry of interests, but they do not 
provide for or rely upon their being succeeded by men of the found-
ing kind. 
Kesler then gives an account of the genesis of the now-prevail-
ing interpretation of The Federalist. More than half a century ago, 
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Charles Beard fastened upon Federalist No. 10 as an authoritative 
guide to American politics-singling it out, however, not for its ar-
gument on behalf of an extended sphere, but as the best existing 
statement of the economic interpretation of politics. Beard's thesis 
was later criticized by Douglass Adair. According to Adair, Pub-
lius did not teach that the clash of economic interests was a mere 
continuation of the age-old class struggle between the few rich and 
the many poor, but rather that it was an alternative to it. The ex-
tension of the sphere of republican government was a modern con-
tribution to an old tradition in which political prudence had sought, 
by favoring a stable middle- class regime, to moderate the conflict of 
economic interests. 
To the same question Martin Diamond brought a wider and a 
deeper acquaintance with the history of political philosophy, com-
bined with a powerful concern for its relevance to contemporary 
American politics. Like Adair, he rejected Beard's economic deter-
minism, while continuing to see in No. 10 the core of The Federal-
ist. Diamond argued that although ancient political philosophy 
(not, however, ancient political practice) was superior to modern 
political philosophy, nonetheless the low-but-solid politics of inter-
est groups that Publius promoted was preferable to the available 
alternatives of rule by zealots or ideologues. 
Kesler, though he expresses some mild appreciation of Dia-
mond's work, rejects Diamond's view of the founding as "terribly 
one-dimensional." (The chapter's seventeenth note cites a book by 
Harry Jaffa for a critique of Diamond along the lines which Kesler 
follows, and it cites as well some of Diamond's writings as showing 
that Diamond himself was not unaware of the problems.) Diamond 
was right to reject ideological politics, says Kesler, but he did not 
properly distinguish political ideology from political philosophy. 
To form citizens or to inform public opinion on the basis of abstract 
truths is not in itself pernicious. In particular, a politics of interest 
groups cannot be defended apart from the ends which it is intended 
to serve and by which it is therefore legitimized-ends which must 
exist in public opinion, the special care of the greatest statesmen. 
To articulate these ends is the task of political philosophy. In order 
to avoid cutting off modern American politics from the wellsprings 
of the Western tradition, and even from the principles of its own 
founding, rejection of ideology must be accompanied by reassertion 
of the authority of political philosophy, and the politics of interest 
groups must be justified by and incorporated into the larger politics 
of public opinion. 
Kesler believes that Diamond neglected the indispensability of 
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traditional prudence in the politics of the founders. Prudence con-
siders where one is going, how one gets there, what is the best that 
can be done here and now, and how to instruct public opinion with-
out scorning its backwardness, or flattering its vanity, or inflaming 
its passions. In a regime of mere interest-group politics, prudence 
may not be needed as much as realistic calculation and skillful ma-
neuver, but in a republican regime where public opinion is every-
thing, prudence is the most necessary virtue. In the "new science of 
politics" -in Diamond's reading of The Federalist as derived from 
modem political philosophy-prudence properly speaking is de-
throned, and republicanism is made the servant of the liberal ends 
of interest-group pluralism. Kesler says, however, that Publius 
claims only to have added improvements to an already existing sci-
ence, and the improvements have to do with only some of the means 
to republicanism. "Publius," after all, was the name of an ancient 
Roman statesman, a founder of the Roman republic. Our Publius, 
according to Kesler, is not a radical innovator but a prudent 
improver. 
After discussing the interpretation of The Federalist, Kesler 
turns to the plan of the book. Th~ Federalist is divided into two 
parts. Its first thirty-six papers discuss what the Union is useful for 
and what is needed for the Union. Only after this do the authors 
discuss the republicanism of the Constitution. The Federalist, that 
is to say, begins with the matter of the new nation, and only after-
ward treats its form. Only after treating necessities does it treat 
good government and the relation between the ends of good govern-
ment and the form of republican government. Coming first in the 
rhetoric of Publius are appeals to necessity and the passion for self-
preservation, and only then come appeals to moderation and the 
concern for what is honorable. Nonetheless, although the argument 
of The Federalist is divided into two parts, these are parts of one 
whole; the teaching about the limits which necessity places on 
human choice is a preparation for choosing wisely when the merits 
of the Constitution are finally presented in their own terms. 
Having called attention to the difference between the part of 
The Federalist which contains No. 10, and the part which follows it, 
Kesler turns to the paper that immediately precedes and introduces 
No. 10. The improved science of politics is introduced in Federalist 
No. 9, says Kesler, in order to persuade the enlightened friends of 
liberty to become republicans. Publius presents this introduction in 
a very careful way, so as to suggest the limitations of the new sci-
ence and avoid a simple identification of himself with Montesquieu. 
Only later, says Kesler, will Publius let the reader see that Publius's 
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case for the Constitution depends upon linking honor with republi-
canism. Publius's own science of politics is not the new science that 
runs from Machiavelli through Hobbes to Montesquieu; it is rather 
the old one as improved by prudence, by experience, and by new 
instrumentalities that are suited to modern conditions. 
Kesler then discusses faction, the problem with which Pub-
lius's improvements are meant to cope. What will control faction is 
not mere Union, but only well-constructed Union-Union that will 
appeal both to friends of republican government and to friends of 
good government. Although Publius does soon establish the recip-
rocal relation between opinions and passions, it is passions or inter-
ests-and not opinions-by which factions are united and actuated, 
according to No. 10. Federalist No. 10 does not propose a multi-
plicity of opinions as a solution to the problem of faction. 
Kesler's discussion goes from the teaching of No. 10 on remov-
ing the causes of faction, to its teaching on controlling the effects of 
faction; the bridge is a discussion of virtue and interests. Kesler 
maintains that No. 10, in discussing the removal of the causes of 
faction, refuses to reduce opinions or reason to the mere effects of 
pre-rational or sub-rational causes, and thus it lays the groundwork 
for the republican politics of public opinion. In doing so, it teaches 
the few not to be unwise and the many not to attempt what is be-
yond their power. The opinions of the few and the many are also 
combined in No. 10's account of interests. Interests in politics arise 
from opinions. A constitutional politics that has a place for a multi-
plicity of interests must rest upon a certain uniformity of opinion. 
Pluralism is not enough. Before human beings can be divided by 
interests and sects, they must be united by citizenship. Interests 
must be joined with virtue. The harmony of interests that underlies 
the multiplicity of interests must be taught and learned, for self-
government requires rising above the interplay and mutual checking 
of factions. Factious interests must be checked so as to allow for 
the predominance of nonfactious interests. Kesler goes on to argue 
that Publius thus does not simply advise controlling the effects of 
faction: Publius teaches about causes, albeit informally, while 
seeming to deal only with effects. He shapes the character of Amer-
ican citizens, albeit indirectly. His discrediting of pure democracy 
as the standard for popular government is a preparation for his ad-
vocacy of a government that is exclusively representative. 
Representation and the extended sphere is Kesler's final topic. 
Representation, working through the forms of the Constitution, 
turns interests into views that can be shaped to the public good. 
Publius in No. 10 is contending, not for a multiplicity of factions, 
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but rather for a multiplicity of interests informed by a common 
opinion. This leads to the republican politics of the later papers. A 
large republic is necessary to alleviate faction, but its size is insuffi-
cient for the purpose and can make the problem even worse. 
Though representation seems in No. 10 to be merely a means for the 
sake of the extended sphere, and the Constitution merely a means 
for the sake of Union, it becomes clear later in The Federalist that 
the large union is a means to the end of making popular government 
better government-by making the government less directly popu-
lar, and by constitutionalizing the passions and the interests of the 
people. Kesler argues that No. 10 overstates the case for the ex-
tended sphere, though it does so for good rhetorical purposes. 
III 
Perhaps Diamond too overstated his case for rhetorical pur-
poses. I have heard him quoted as having said that among the les-
sons on rhetoric which he had learned from many years of public 
speaking were "never say merely that Manhattan is an island, but 
say instead that Manhattan is an island entirely surrounded by 
water," and "when in Rome, correct the errors of the Romans." 
Diamond's writings were more akin to modem public speeches than 
to classical writings of political philosophy. In the forum where he 
spoke, appeals to antique virtue would not have gotten much of a 
hearing, whereas his appeal to what was "low but solid" enabled 
him to make some headway in his struggles with the left, both old 
and new. 
Although generously accepting the constraints under which 
Diamond did his work, Kesler tries to show that the result was a 
distortion of the teaching of the founders. Kesler speaks much 
truth in this chapter, and some of it is truth much needed. At times 
he may squeeze a bit too much out of a few words from Publius, but 
this is a relatively minor fault, considering the prevalence of cursory 
reading in our time. More serious is the exaggeration in Kesler's 
contrast between the two parts of The Federalist-the one on 
Union, and the other on the form of the government proposed for 
the Union. There is something to what he says, but I find in the 
latter part of Publius's discussion more of a concern for harsh ne-
cessity than Kesler implies, and I do not find in the earlier part such 
shrewd calculation in the service of continuity with tradition. 
The formation of opinion, after all, can serve very different 
purposes--even the purposes of the founders of that new political 
science which relies upon the interplay of passions. Hobbes, for 
one, makes it very clear that the interplay of passions cannot do its 
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low but solid work unless those who have a monopoly on the legiti-
mate use of force maintain the enlightened opinions needed to sup-
port his scheme. Not only heat but light-relentless propagation of 
the right opinions-is essential to the struggle against what he calls 
the kingdom of darkness. 
In considering the American founders we must therefore ask 
not whether they. sought to promote opinions, but rather what were 
the opinions that they fostered. It is difficult to imagine anything 
on the level of The Federalist appearing in political debate today. 
Do the founders bear no responsibility at all for this? They may not 
have sought to lower public life in order to make it more solid, and 
some things may, because of the work of the founders, be higher 
today than they were in the days of the founding, but are there 
nonetheless some things that are lower now, and lower because of 
things the founders taught? The teaching of the founders may not 
have been as low as some have said it was, but was it quite as lofty 
as Kesler now suggests? And the dignity that it did have-was that 
simply due to what in it was classical or traditional? 
When Alexander Hamilton dropped out of college to take a 
military part in the struggle over taxation without representation, 
for a time he kept his reading notes in the paybook of the artillery 
company that he organized, and the notes that were kept by this 
future "Publius" and public financier-to-be were pretty much di-
vided between Plutarch and Postlethwayt. The latter of this pair of 
writers from whom he obtained inspiration and instruction was the 
author of a book called The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Com-
merce-a fact which goes along with the fact that the teacher to 
whom he seems to have recurred for wisdom was not Plato so much 
as Hume. Moreover, when he formed the intention, in his later life, 
to preside over an immense project of research and writing in polit-
ical science, he named as its tutelary spirit not Aristotle but Bacon. 
We must ask ourselves: Does Kesler, though for good rhetorical 
purposes, overstate his case? 
IV 
Kesler's chapter on Federalist No. 10 and American republi-
canism is the first in the set of chapters on The Federalist's first part 
(on the Union). The first chapter in the set on The Federalist's sec-
ond part (on the particular form ofthe government of the Union) is 
William Kristol's discussion of the separation of powers in The Fed-
eralist Nos. 47 through 51. Kesler, in his Introduction, says that 
Kristol redirects our attention to the separation of powers as The 
Federalist's greatest contribution to political science. According to 
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Kesler, Kristol shows how radically the principle of separated pow-
ers cuts across the popular principle, and therefore to what extent 
the American regime may be understood as an approximation 
under modem conditions to the classical idea of the mixed regime; 
he shows, says Kesler, that the separation of powers makes the 
American form of government more aristocratic than it otherwise 
would or perhaps even could be, which in tum affects, however in-
directly, the character of the American people. Kristol himself does 
not quite say this, but Kesler is led to say it by what Kristol does 
say. 
The point of departure for Kristol's chapter is the following 
thought: although the separation of powers is an authoritative prin-
ciple in interpreting the Constitution, it is nonetheless a curiously 
obscure one. Kristol suggests that an examination of Publius's gen-
eral discussion of the principle in Federalist Nos. 47 though 51 may 
help us to begin to understand such questions as these: By what 
principles are the powers separated and distributed? What is the 
character and purpose of each power? What is the relation between 
the principle of the separation of powers and the principle of repub-
licanism? Why does Publius hesitate to confront these questions 
directly, so that the principle of the separation of powers as a whole 
seems so indirect or opaque? 
An understanding of the separation of powers and its underly-
ing principles is the key to understanding the structure of govern-
ment established by the Constitution, according to Kristol. Indeed, 
he says, the central question of The Federalist is the relation be-
tween the government's general form, which is republican, and its 
particular structure, informed by the principle of separation of 
powers. 
In keeping with Publius's general hesitancy to lay out princi-
ples, Kristol continues, the discussion of the particular structure of 
the federal government is introduced, in No. 47, as a response to an 
objection. The discussion begins with a curious abstraction from 
the differences between the various forms of government, and with a 
curious recurrence to the authority of Montesquieu, who himself is 
somewhat indirect. The separation of powers, which will impede 
direct recurrence to the people as a principle of government, is itself 
introduced indirectly, says Kristol. 
Publius then concentrates on the maintenance of the separation 
of powers for the sake of liberty, rather than on the correct distribu-
tion of power and on what makes it correct. The question that is 
first for us takes priority over-and obscures-the question that is 
first in itself. For us, the requirements of republican government 
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must be shown to be met before the requirements of good govern-
ment can be. 
Before presenting his own solution to the problem of maintain-
ing the separation of powers in No. 51, Publius in Nos. 48-50 shows 
the insufficiency of some other solutions. His criticism of the first 
solution (parchment barriers), in No. 48, is the occasion for a criti-
cism of the state constitutions and therewith also of the inadequate 
view of republican government informing them. In that view, sepa-
ration of powers is a support for, rather than a check upon, the 
power of the legislature--the republican branch par excellence. In 
Nos. 49-50, Publius goes further. By rejecting the solution of 
resorting to the people, he makes it clear that rule by the people--
the republican principle itself-is in tension with the maintenance 
and even with the purpose of the separation of powers. The Consti-
tution, whose principle is the separation of powers, becomes an au-
thority over the people who authorize it. The Constitution derives 
its dignity from two different sources: its being an act of the people, 
on the one hand-and, on the other, its being an embodiment of 
standards of good government outside the people's will. Popular 
government and good government are not simply identical. To 
bring them together, insofar as it is possible, is the statesmanship of 
Publius. Kristol contends that wisdom and consent are linked by 
uniting time and numbers: the American regime is to be supported 
by the double effect of a popular origin and a lack of recurrent ap-
peals to the people. 
Publius's discussion of his own solution to the problem of 
maintaining the separation of powers, in No. 51, shows the source 
of the difficulty that we encounter in thinking and speaking about 
the Constitution: politics requires the reconciliation of different 
principles that must be mixed in the structure of the government. 
By the end of No. 51, the central and general theme of separation of 
powers has given way to the peripheral and particularly American 
theme of federalism and of the extended sphere which it allows, 
thus mitigating any apparent tension between the separation of 
powers and republican government. 
Publius's discussion of the particular powers in the sequel 
(Federalist Nos. 52 through 83), Kristol says, will teach us more 
about the separation of powers and about the character of each of 
the powers; it will teach us in more detail about how the principles 
of the separation of powers can be incorporated into the republican 
form of government in America so as not to disturb the republican 
cause, and indeed to vindicate what is true in the republican cause. 
We'll learn this not only from what Publius will say, but also from 
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how he will say it. It is as a preparation for this, that the republican 
principle is modified in the course of the discussion that occupies 
Nos. 47 through 51, says K.ristol. At the end of No. 51, when Pub-
lius again brings republicanism to the fore, he obscures the extent to 
which the republican principle has been modified, and he shows by 
this how the separation of powers can be inconspicuously accom-
modated to the republican form of the American regime. 
v 
Let us consider K.ristol's chapter in the context of the editor's 
intention to oppose the prevailing interpretation of The Federalist. 
Kesler in his own opening chapter rejects the view that No. 10 is the 
core of The Federalist's teaching of a new science of politics. That 
paper, he says, is a step on the way to presenting the new republic of 
the Constitution, and the core of The Federalist is its improved re-
publicanism. The new republic's ends are old; only some of its 
means are new. Extension of the republican sphere is one of the 
new republican means, but it is not the central feature of The Feder-
alist's republicanism. 
Kristol's chapter presents the teaching of Nos. 47 through 51 
as a preparation for the central question of The Federalist. The cen-
tral feature of The Federalist's republicanism is the separation of 
powers. The separation of powers is obscure and is presented indi-
rectly because its principle is not the republican principle. Republi-
can government with a separation of powers is questionably 
republican. It is a mixture of what is republican and what is not 
republican. 
The editor in the Introduction gives a summary restatement of 
Kristol's chapter. Is this restatement a more direct and less obscure 
statement of what Kristol means? If so, is K.ristol's chapter more 
politic-more Publius-like-than the editor's restatement of it? Or 
does Kristol not go so far as Kesler says he goes? Does Kristol 
merely avoid asserting, or would he in fact deny, what Kesler sug-
gests-that the founders sought indirectly to elevate the character 
of the American people by introducing something like aristocracy 
into the American republic in the guise of a device for protecting 
liberty? 
Is the United States, that is to say, a mixed regime in mask, or 
is it a purely popular regime of liberty improved in its effectiveness 
by a separation of powers which renders it complex? Perhaps the 
teaching of The Federalist is neither low nor lofty, but is rather 
squarely in the middle. If the problem of the separation of powers 
is the problem of republicanism in America, what is the best way to 
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characterize that problem? Just what is the non-popular principle 
that needs to be mixed with the popular? Is Publius being disingen-
uous when he speaks in terms of combining energy with republican 
safety, and of giving efficacy to popular government? When Publius 
speaks of energy, stability, and efficacy, is he merely being politic in 
not speaking of a mixed regime-or would it be better to say that 
Publius is himself committed to a test of purely popular government 
not merely because it is unavoidable in the circumstances but also 
because a purely popular government, if it can somehow be made 
effective, is desirable in itself? 
Publius is hardly shy about publicizing his belief that popular 
government is not as such identical with good government. Indeed, 
he is probably more candid than someone in his position would be 
today. Popular government is not as such good government, but 
from this it does not follow that good government as such is mixed 
government. It may be that, while mixed government can be some-
thing not so bad, nonetheless a fairly good popular government 
would be even better. Perhaps a purely popular government, with 
non-popular ingredients to make it effective, would be a very good 
government-one that it would be misleading to call an aristocratic 
republic. 
A government that is purely popular cannot contain any parts 
constituted by a part of the population other than the people, but it 
can be a complex of parts that structures the people's choosing and 
thus be not simply popular, just as a well-trained horse, while it is 
not simply a horse, is nonetheless purely a horse-rather than a 
mixture like a mule. (I am aware that someone might seize upon 
this to suggest that horses are trained to be ridden by a superior 
being, booted and spurred, but I do not mean to suggest it.) Con-
sider the Senate. With respect to that institution, the non-popular 
principles of The Federalist have to do not so much with different 
sorts of human beings-not so much with indirect influence for the 
wise and virtuous, the rich, or the well-born-as with establishing 
incentives and impediments that will increase the likelihood of cer-
tain kinds of effects which, far from going counter to the persistent 
wishes of the people, will please the multitude in the long run. 
What Publius hopes will be particularly characteristic of the Sen-
ate-with its continuity as a body, and the duration of the terms of 
its members-is a tendency to promote stability and foresight. 
Take for example what he says about how its members will have 
incentives to acquire a knowledge of foreign affairs which would 
otherwise be lacking in the government. Or consider the judiciary. 
What Publius regards as being essential to their work, and as setting 
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them apart, is the independence which can foster impartiality and 
non partisanship. 
Even readers who question the conclusions of Kristol and Kes-
ler will learn much from their close reading of The Federalist, and 
from the remaining chapters of the book, about which, unfortu-
nately, time does not permit me to say very much. 
VI 
The discussion of The Federalist No. 51 is continued by Wil-
liam B. Allen, in a chapter whose theme is not the separation of 
powers, but rather the concern of Madison for the centrality of jus-
tice in the life of the people. Allen throws much light on this by 
bringing in some other writings by Madison. 
There is no chapter on the legislature as such (or on the Sen-
ate), but there is an excellent chapter by Thomas G. West on the 
rule of law in The Federalist. After introducing the rule of law as a 
consequence of the principles of the American Revolution, West 
proceeds to the separation of powers and the need for a written con-
stitution, and then to the meaning of legislative balances and 
checks, after which he treats the relation between representation 
and excellence, and then safety and happiness, as the ends of legisla-
tion. A reader interested in the question of how low or lofty were 
the aspirations of the founders would do well to depart from the 
order of the chapters, which seeks to parallel the order of the papers 
in The Federalist, and read West immediately after Kesler. 
On the other hand, for the question of how central is the teach-
ing of the extended republic, a reader would do well to move from 
Kesler immediately to Kristol, and then to the chapter immediately 
after West's, which is Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.'s essay on the execu-
tive. Its theme is the The Federalist's achievement in showing that 
an energetic executive could be republicanized. Mansfield, in show-
ing how this easily underestimated feat was accomplished, employs 
the notion of the constitutionalizing of necessities. This fine discus-
sion points the reader in a somewhat different direction from that 
suggested by Kesler and West. In other words, the question of how 
to state the problem of republican government remains a question in 
this book. One author makes it seem that what the republican prin-
ciple needs is the admixture of a principle of aristocracy, while an-
other makes it seem that what is needed is a principle of 
effectiveness. What the editor has given us is not a catechism but an 
inquiry. 
Next comes Jeremy Rabkin's chapter on post-Publian execu-
tive officialdom-on how The Federalist understands good adminis-
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tration as "value" -laden politics, in contrast to those European 
thinkers whose views were later very influential in the theory and 
practice of late-nineteenth and twentieth-century American public 
administration. 
The chapters on executive power are followed by James 
Stoner's discussion of constitutionalism and judging in The Federal-
ist. Stoner discusses the questionable status of judging in the Amer-
ican republic, the limits of Publius's treatment of it, and the need to 
recur to the common law for light upon the question. 
Following this discussion of judicial power in America, its 
great instrument (the Bill of Rights) becomes a question in Ralph A 
Rossum's chapter on The Federalist's understanding of the Consti-
tution (without the Bill of Rights) as itself a bill of rights. 
These chapters on the content of The Federalist are followed by 
two chapters on the reading given to The Federalist before the now-
prevailing interpretation arose. Jack N. Rakove shows how The 
Federalist was used in public controversy during the century follow-
ing its publication, and then Dennis J. Mahoney shows how the rise 
of American political science in the half century after the Civil War 
involved the rejection of the teaching of The Federalist in the name 
of progress, until Beard's revival of its reputation provoked the cri-
tiques of Beard's interpretation by Douglass Adair and Martin Dia-
mond-which is where this book begins. It ends with a chapter by 
Edward C. Banfield, reminding us that the success of what The Fed-
eralist sought to promote by reflection and by choice was in fact 
largely the result of chance. 
But chance favors the prepared mind, as a great experimenter 
once said. Few books prepare us as well as does The Federalist for 
thinking about that great experiment in human affairs which is the 
regime in which we live. And few books take the thought of The 
Federalist as seriously as this one does. Reading it, and thinking 
about what we read, will help us to understand The Federalist 
better. 
